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Abstract 
 
The emergence of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe has provoked very 
different responses from mainstream parties. Some have tried to counter the anti-
immigrant parties, while others have tried to recapture lost voters by taking a tougher 
stance on immigration. Country comparative studies have tried to determine the 
effectiveness of different strategies, but systematic testing has been impaired by 
small-n problems. Therefore this paper exploits sub-national variation in 290 Swedish 
municipalities to investigate the effect of mainstream party strategy on anti-immigrant 
electoral success. The paper finds that a tougher stance on immigration of mainstream 
parties is correlated with more anti-immigrant party support, even when controlling 
for a large number of socio-economic, historical and regional factors. This result 
indicates that mainstream parties legitimize anti-immigrant parties by taking a tougher 
position on immigration. However, the results presented in the paper show that it is 
not enough that one mainstream party takes a tougher position, it is only when the 
entire political mainstream are tougher on immigration that the anti-immigrant party 
benefits. What is more, toughness of the parties on the left seem to be more 
legitimizing than the toughness of the parties on the right. 
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Introduction 
The last three decades, a new brand of political parties has emerged in Western Europe. 
Today, anti-immigrant parties are represented in Parliaments in countries such as Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden. 
The electoral support for anti-immigrant parties are however unstable over time and there 
are still several West European countries, such as Spain, Germany and the UK, in which 
they have weak electoral support. This paper explores one promising explanation for 
short-term variations in anti-immigrant party support, and tests this explanation on a 
unique sub-national data-set. More specifically, the paper investigates if mainstream 
parties’ positions in the immigration issue (tough stance on immigration or not) facilitate 
or impede anti-immigrant party electoral support.1  
 
Using time-variant cross-country data and pooled election studies, scholars have been 
able to draw stable conclusions regarding gender, class and other socio-economic 
characteristics of anti-immigrant voters (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; 
Norris 2005; van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2005). Literature has also explored the 
effects of institutional settings, such as electoral systems and parliamentary thresholds 
(Jackman and Volpert 1996; Swank and Betz 2003), the history and ideological origin of 
                                                 
1 We follow van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2005, 537) and use the term anti-immigrant parties for the 
parties at point (see also Fennema 1997). There are two reasons why we prefer the term anti-immigrant 
parties. First, as van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2005, 538) point out; the immigration issue is of core 
political concern for all parties in this group of parties. Second, it is not self-evident that parties in this party 
group should be placed at the right end of the political spectrum. The Swedish case illustrates this. Both the 
voters of the largest anti-immigrant party in Sweden and their representatives, place themselves in the 
center of the political spectrum (Holmberg, Näsman and Wänström 2010, 23; Gilljam, Karlsson and 
Sundell 2010, 19). This makes us reluctant to choose a terminology that already from the outset places 
these parties at the “extreme” (Carter 2005; Mudde 1996) or “radical” (Mudde 2007; Norris 2005; Rydgren 
2007) right end of the spectrum. 
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anti-immigrant parties (Carter 2002; Ivarsflaten 2006), and factors triggering citizen 
demand for anti-immigrant policy, such as levels of and changes in immigration and 
unemployment (Arzheimer 2009; Golder 2003; Knigge 1998; Lubbers, Gijsberts and 
Scheepers 2002). 
 
However, even in the probably most comprehensive study so far, where answers from 
175,000 respondents in 18 countries over a time-period of 23 years were analyzed, the 
author concluded that “persistent country effects prevail” (Arzheimer 2009, 259). This 
underlines that we have still not reached a full understanding of the dynamics leading up 
to electoral anti-immigrant party success, in spite of the high sophistication of the field.  
 
In our view, the most promising line of research in this field explores the effects of issue 
strategies of mainstream parties (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Bale 
2003; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Meguid 2005, 2008). The basic idea is that 
mainstream parties can impede or facilitate the growth of anti-immigrant parties, 
depending on how they handle the immigration issue. Two inter-related factors have been 
identified in this literature: the salience of the immigration issue, and the mainstream 
parties’ position on the issue. 
 
Research has show that anti-immigrant parties benefit from high saliency of the 
immigration issue. These results are stable both when tested on individual and system 
level (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Bale 2003), implicating that a 
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“dismissive” strategy which keeps the issue saliency low is the most effective (Meguid 
2005, 350). 
 
However, empirical evidence is more ambiguous when it comes to the effects of 
mainstream party stance in the immigration issue. Two rival hypotheses can be 
crystallized from the literature. The first – the impeding hypothesis – says that we should 
expect a decline in electoral support for anti-immigrant parties if mainstream parties take 
a tough position on immigration, as the mainstream parties thereby take ownership of the 
immigration issue (Meguid 2005, 2008; van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2005). The 
second – the facilitating hypothesis – holds the opposite expectation. It says that if 
mainstream parties takes a tough position on immigration, voters interpret this as a signal 
that tougher policies are relevant, which helps the anti-immigrant party to overcome a 
barrier of non-respectability and thus helps it to gain more votes (Arzheimer 2009; 
Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Bale 2003). 
 
These hypotheses have been tested in cross-country studies, but results are hampered by 
small n-problems. Even in the more sophisticated studies not more than 22 (van der Brug, 
Fennema and Tillie 2005) or 24 (Arzheimer and Carter 2006) elections are included, 
which makes it hard to draw firm conclusions of the effects of different strategies. 
Therefore, this paper employs a different research strategy and tests these two rival 
hypothesis using data on the 290 Swedish local governments in the 2010 elections. 
 
 
 
6
The sub-national setting is ideal as it keeps important institutional and cultural factors 
constant, while it exhibits rich variation both in the strategies mainstream parties employ 
and in electoral anti-immigrant party support. We have at our disposal unique data 
capturing the immigration policy positions among politicians at the local level in Sweden, 
which allow us to evaluate the effects of tougher immigration issue positions among the 
mainstream parties.  
 
Our main results support the facilitating hypothesis. We therefore conclude that tough 
policy positions of mainstream parties in the immigration issue help anti-immigrant party 
success. However, contrary to previous research we demonstrate that it is not enough if 
one mainstream party takes a tougher stance on immigration. In order to affect the 
electoral success of the anti-immigrant party the whole immigration discourse must 
become tougher, which we interpret as a legitimizing effect. We also report the perhaps 
counterintuitive result that tougher positions of the parties on the political left are more 
important for anti-immigrant party success than tougher positions of the parties on the 
political right.  
 
Tough Policy Positions and Anti-Immigrant Party Support  
Theories of prime interest for this paper are those focusing on the effects of strategies of 
mainstream parties. Both classical theories of party competition (Downs 1957) and more 
recent theories of party strategies (Meguid 2005, 2008) highlights the strategic 
importance of competing parties’ policy positions. As mentioned in the introduction two 
rival hypotheses have evolved from this discussion. In the more classical view a 
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competing party can take voters from an anti-immigrant party by occupying a party 
position close the anti-immigrant party, e.g. take a tougher stance on immigration. From 
this perspective the most probable outcome from this competition is a vote loss for the 
anti-immigrant party (van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2005, 548).  
 
There is however also the opposite hypothesis. The rationale behind this is that although 
voters might have anti-immigration attitudes, they do not act on these preferences on 
Election Day because anti-immigrant parties are not seen as legitimate alternatives. 
Therefore, anti-immigrant parties need to overcome a barrier of non-respectability before 
they can attract a larger proportion of the voters. This was for example probably the case 
in Sweden for a long time. The general public in Sweden has much tougher attitudes on 
immigration then their representatives in mainstream parties. Between 1994 and 2006 the 
disagreement between MPs and voters in Sweden were several times larger than on any 
other issue. This policy disagreement did for a long time not result in any substantial 
support for an anti-immigrant party in Sweden, which may indicate that in spite of a large 
demand for anti-immigration policy something hindered Swedish voters to vote for an 
anti-immigrant party (Dahlström and Esaiasson, forthcoming). According to this theory, 
tough policy positions by mainstream parties helps anti-immigrant parties to overcome 
the barrier of non-respectability because voters will interpret it as a signal that tough 
immigration polities are relevant. Thus, from this perspective the most probable outcome 
of a tough immigration policy position by mainstream parties is an anti-immigrant party 
vote gain (Arzheimer 2009, 264; Arzheimer and Carter 2006, 424). We call the first the 
impeding hypothesis and the second the facilitating hypothesis. 
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Theory has however been ambiguous on two key aspects of the hypotheses. We therefore 
take two steps in order to specify the theory and test the two hypotheses empirically.  
 
First, the causal mechanism suggested by the facilitating hypothesis imply that a 
legitimizing process starts when mainstream parties takes a tough stance on immigration, 
a process that eventually break down the taboo around this policy position. As anti-
immigrant parties are closely associated with a tough stance on immigration, making this 
position more legitimate this will increase their support (ibid.). But, how much does it 
take to break the taboo? Is it enough if one of the mainstream parties takes a tough 
immigration policy position? Or does the whole immigration policy discourse have to 
move in a tougher direction? This paper acknowledges both possibilities and tests them 
empirically. 
 
 Second, it is not clear if all parties can play an impeding or facilitating role. Some 
studies are only geared towards the positions of right parties (Bale 3003; Carter and 
Arzheimer 2006), while others also consider policy positions of left parties (Arzheimer 
2009). As shown by Meguid (2005) party competition between mainstream parties and 
niche parties, such as anti-immigrant parties, are sensitive not only to the policy position 
by the party closest to the anti-immigrant party, but also to the position of the other 
parties. We therefore include policy positions of all parties in this study. We use this 
information to study if the effects of left and right parties differ, and to evaluate the effect 
of all parties individually. 
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As mentioned in the introduction, several other explanatory factors have been suggested 
and tested empirically (for recent reviews, see Rydgren 2007; van der Brug and Fennema 
2007). While relevant in cross-country studies, some of the theories are not well-suited to 
explain the short-term variations of prime interest in this paper. Important examples of 
theories highlighting fairly stable variables are theories concerning the effects of electoral 
systems and parliamentary thresholds and other institutional arrangements (Jackman and 
Volpert 1996; Norris 2005; Swank and Betz 2003). Other interesting examples are 
theories that stress history and ideological origin of anti-immigrant parties (Ignazie 1992; 
Kitschelt 1995; Carter 2002; Ivarsflaten 2006). In this paper we will however not be able 
to evaluate any of these theories as we by way of design hold institutional and party-
historical factors constant.  
 
Of more direct interest for this paper are theories emphasizing factors triggering citizen 
demand for anti-immigrant policy, such as levels of immigration and unemployment. 
Several studies have theorized the relationship between unemployment and immigration 
on the one hand, and anti-immigrant party support on the other hand. These theories have 
however had mixed empirical support. Some studies have indeed found that the number 
of immigrants or asylum seekers in the country positively affects the electoral support for 
anti-immigrant parties (Arzheimer 2009, 269; Golder 2003, 451; Lubbers, Gijsberts and 
Scheepers 2002), while others have failed to establish such a relationship (Norris 2005, 
172; van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2005, 555). Unemployment is in some studies 
associated with electoral success for anti-immigrant parties (Jackman and Volpert 1996; 
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Golder 2003), while other studies show a counterintuitive negative relationship 
(Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Knigge 1998). In one recent study the interaction between 
unemployment, immigration and unemployment benefits was tested empirically, reviling 
a complicated interaction pattern (Arzheimer 2009, 273). 
 
As the unit of analysis in this paper is local governments, and not individuals, the paper is 
not design to directly test these or other individual level factors which are associated with 
anti-immigrant party support, such as gender or education. We will however control for 
aggregate levels of immigration, unemployment, gender and education in all empirical 
models, but without ambition to directly evaluate these individual level theories. 
 
In sum, we will focus on party positions of mainstream parties and its effect on anti-
immigrant party support, while holding most institutional and historical explanations 
constant and controlling for the aggregate levels socio-economic explanations. We will 
test both the effect of the extreme position among the mainstream parties (suggesting that 
it is enough if one mainstream party has a tough position) and the effect of the mean 
position of all mainstream parties (suggesting that the political discourse must be 
tougher). We will also analyze if it matters if it is mainstream left parties or mainstream 
right parties that has a tough position on immigration. Finally, we will evaluate the effect 
of the position of individual mainstream parties.  
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The Case: Swedish Local Governments 
Since our methodological approach in some aspects differs from the convention of cross-
country comparisons, some clarifications are called for. One obvious advantage of using 
data on the sub-national level is that the data is less analyzed than data on the national 
level (see however Dülmer and Markusklein 2005; Kestilä and Söderlund 2007; and 
Lubbers and Scheepers 2001, 2002 for examples of studies on anti-immigrant parties on 
the sub-national level). Anti-immigrant parties in European national parliaments have 
been extensively studied in both a plethora of case studies and in many cross-country 
comparisons. Rigid theory-testing is hence impaired by the fact that most theories were 
developed from the same data. Furthermore, the sub-national approach also provides rich 
variation in party strategy, while keeping institutional factors, such as the electoral 
system, and historical factors, such as the background of the anti-immigrant party, 
constant. 
 
However, for a study of local governments to address questions posed by the existing 
cross-country literature, the local governments need to have similar competencies as the 
national governments, albeit at a smaller scale. In Sweden, this is clearly the case. The 
municipal councils (the local parliaments) are elected every fourth year in tandem with 
the national parliamentary elections, and turnout is usually only a few percentage points 
lower than in the Riksdag elections (which means over 77 percent in all elections since 
1973). Parties represented in the municipal councils are mostly the same as in the 
Riksdag, even if not all Riksdag parties are represented in all municipal councils. Many 
municipal councils also include a local party. 
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The municipal councils have vast competencies in international comparison, and are even 
able to set the level of taxation. This is necessary, as they are responsible for the 
provision of key portions of the welfare state such as primary and secondary education, 
child care and care of the elderly. Moreover, Swedish local governments are in many 
municipalities the biggest employer (Bäck, 2003). 
 
Of special importance to this study is that the municipal councils decide on the number of 
refugees that will be received in the municipality. Exploiting a natural experiment 
situation that arises from a feature of the mandate allocation system in Sweden, Folke 
(2010) find that representation of New Democracy in municipal councils had a significant 
negative impact on the number of received refugees in municipalities in the 1990’s. (New 
Democracy was a short-lived party with a tough stance on immigration, represented in 
the Swedish Riksdag from 1991-1994.) This shows that local politics matter for the issue 
of interest. General conclusions drawn from the study of local governments in Sweden 
should thus travel reasonably well to the national context. 
 
Still, one needs to be careful when drawing conclusions from the comparison of sub-
national political units. In an illuminating critique of a study by Kestilä and Söderlund 
(2007), Arzheimer and Carter (2009) highlight several shortcomings of the study in 
particular and of sub-national studies in general. For instance, it is not possible in an 
ecological analysis to estimate the effects of individual characteristics such as 
unemployment or immigrant background on vote choice. All such variables are in our 
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study only used as controls. However, factors pertaining to party strategy are common to 
all individuals in a political unit and can thus be studied on the ecological level. 
Arzheimer and Carter (2009) also raise the issue of possible spatial correlations between 
sub-national units in the same region. As we discuss in the data and methodology section, 
we therefore include regional fixed effects, which soak up explanatory factors at the 
regional level. 
 
Furthermore, one of Arzheimer and Carter’s (2009) main objections to the Kestilä and 
Söderlund (2007) study is that they fail to take into account the ideology of the 
mainstream parties at the local level. Our study addresses exactly this issue, as we 
measure the position of the other parties on the immigration issue in each municipality. 
 
Data and Methodology 
The dependent variable is the percentage of valid votes received by the Sweden 
Democrats in the municipal elections of 2010, which is logged to account for skewness. 
The main independent variable is the toughness of the mainstream parties on the 
immigration issue. Arzheimer and Carter (2006) and Arzheimer (2009) use manifesto 
data to determine how tough mainstream parties are on immigration. While this approach 
is fruitful in cross-country comparisons, it is less so in within-country studies. Local 
election manifestos, especially in smaller municipalities, can not be expected to reflect 
the positions of the parties as well as national election manifestos. Instead, we utilize a 
pioneering web survey of all 13 000 local politicians in Sweden, administered in the fall 
of 2008, the midst of the last election period (Gilljam, Karlsson and Sundell 2010). The 
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response rate of the survey was 70 percent, and was over 50 percent in 98 percent of the 
290 municipalities. 
 
Respondents in the study were asked two questions about immigration, which we 
compiled to an index (Cronbach’s α = 0.82) of toughness towards immigration.2 We then 
calculate the position of the toughest mainstream party in each municipality, which we 
use as a measure of the limit of mainstream anti-immigration attitudes, similar to 
Arzheimer (2009). This is more inclusive than Arzheimer and Carter (2006) who instead 
use the position of the largest conservative party to capture the same dynamic. In general, 
it might be assumed that the largest party on each side of the political spectrum is the 
main agenda setter, but the following example illustrates that other parties may serve to 
legitimize anti-immigration policies.  
 
Immigration is rarely a salient theme in Swedish election campaigns, but 2002 is an 
exception. Late in that campaign, the Liberal party proposed that immigrants should be 
required to take a language test when applying for citizenship, which drew sharp criticism 
from several of the other parties (Dahlström and Esaiasson, forthcoming). The Liberals 
were accused of being xenophobic, but still increased their vote share from 4.7 to 13.4 
percent in the election. In this case, a policy proposal of a small party in the middle of the 
                                                 
2 The questions were phrased as suggestions, one concerning the politicians’ municipality and the other 
Sweden as a whole: “When it comes to the municipality where you live: What is your opinion on each of 
the following suggestions? Receive more refugees in the municipality”, and “Below are a number of 
proposals that have been put forward in the political debate. What is your opinion on each of them? 
Receive fewer refugees in Sweden”. Five response options were available: “Very good suggestion”, 
“Moderately good suggestion”, “Neither good nor bad suggestion”, “Moderately bad suggestion” and 
“Very bad suggestion”. 
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political spectrum put immigration on the agenda. It is therefore necessary to include 
attitudes towards immigration from parties other than the largest conservative party. 
 
However, we also calculate the mean toughness of the mainstream parties in the 
municipality. This measure is used to test the hypothesis that it is the immigration stance 
of the entire political mainstream that matters for anti-immigrant party success, rather 
than the position of the most extreme party. 
 
The response rate of the survey used to calculate the mean toughness of the party is high, 
but there are still some gaps. Average toughness in each party in the municipality is 
hence weighted to account for missing responses in the calculation of the municipal 
measure. In the few municipalities where the representatives of one party on the 
municipal council are completely missing in the data, toughness for that party is replaced 
with the average toughness of the party in question nationwide.3 
 
Our theory predicts that the level of support for the anti-immigrant party depends on the 
mainstream parties’ toughness in the immigration issue. However, model specification 
must account for both problems of reverse causality and omitted variable bias. We take 
several steps to reduce these problems. First, we include the level of support for the 
Sweden Democrats in 2006 as a control variable. This effectively means that the 
dependent variable is the change in support for the Sweden Democrats between 2006 and 
2010. By doing so, we reduce the risk of reverse causality in the model. In order for 
                                                 
3 The correlation between the weighted and the unweighted measure (that is, the average toughness of all 
mainstream party representatives that answered the survey in the municipality) is .90. 
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reverse causality to be the cause of a correlation between the toughness of the mainstream 
parties in 2008 and the change in SD support, mainstream politicians must be assumed to 
anticipate the election results two years in advance, which we find implausible. 
 
Omitted variable bias is instead the most serious caveat facing the model. It is likely that 
there are factors that affect both mainstream party toughness and electoral support for SD 
in the municipality. We include three sets of control variables to minimize the risk that 
possible results are spurious. 
 
First, we include known determinants of anti-immigrant votes. Following Arzheimer 
(2009), we control for the mean age, squared mean age (to account for an inverse-u 
relationship), proportion men, proportion highly educated, proportion unemployed, and 
proportion foreign-born. To draw conclusions about how individuals are affected by for 
instance age or education from the basis of the estimated coefficients of these variables 
would obviously be an example of ecological fallacy. They are thus included in the 
analysis only as control variables, and their respective coefficients are not of interest for 
this paper. 
 
Second, a possible confounding factor could be popular demand for anti-immigrant 
policies, driven by some kind of (unknown) cultural or historical factor not captured by 
our first control variables. To account for this we add two further controls to the model. 
In order to pick up long-term historical factors, we include the share of votes received by 
the Nationalist party in the Riksdag elections 1936 in the municipality. The reason for 
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choosing the election 1936 is that it is the only time a nationalist or nazi party was big 
enough to merit inclusion in the official election statistics. Data for the variable is 
obtained from Berglund and Dellerbrandt (1986).  
 
In order to pick up more short-term cultural factors, the share of votes received by New 
Democracy (a short-lived party with a tough stance on immigration, represented in the 
Swedish Riksdag between 1991 and 1994) in the Riksdag elections 1994 in the 
municipality is included in the model. The reason why we include the votes for New 
Democracy in the 1994 rather than in 1991 is that the party started off as an anti-
establishment party in 1991 and turned into a full-blown anti-immigrant party first before 
the 1994 election (Dahlström and Esaiasson, forthcoming). New Democracy only 
received 1.2 percent of the popular vote in 1994, but a vote for New Democracy in 1994 
is hence a better indication of anti-immigrant leanings than a vote for the same party in 
the preceding election. 
 
However, it is possible that there are additional omitted variables that could give rise to a 
spurious correlation between mainstream party toughness and SD support. For instance, it 
is well known that the Sweden Democrats tend to perform better in the southern regions. 
As a third and final test, we therefore include dummy variables for the 21 administrative 
regions in Sweden, to capture unobserved regional differences. In this final model, 
correlations between mainstream toughness and SD support are due to within-region 
effects. Summary statistics are presented in table 1.  
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*** Table 1 about here*** 
 
Results 
The two main independent variables, maximum and mean mainstream party anti-
immigration toughness, are tested in three models each, with different sets of control 
variables. In table 2 models 1 and 2 only control for the support for SD in 2006. Socio-
economic controls are introduced in models 3 and 4, while regional dummy variables are 
introduced in models 5 and 6. Models 1, 3 and 5 thus test the effect of a tougher average 
policy position on immigration among mainstream parties (mean toughness), and models 
2, 4 and 6 test the effect of the toughest position from a mainstream party (maximum 
toughness). 
 
***Table 2 about here*** 
 
The coefficient for maximum toughness is positive, but not statistically significant in any 
of the specifications. This is not very surprising as the result is in line with the findings of 
Arzheimer (2009) and Arzheimer and Carter (2006). A tough stance on immigration by 
one mainstream party does not seem to legitimize the anti-immigrant party. 
 
However, the coefficient for mean toughness is positive and highly significant in all three 
specifications. In the most demanding specification, where both socio-economic controls 
and regional dummy variables are included in the model (model 5), is the coefficient 
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1.00. The toughness scale is a 9-point scale that has been coded to range from 0 to 1. The 
coefficient thus describes the maximum possible effect of the variable.  
 
What does the effect signify in substantive terms? A one standard deviation increase in 
mainstream party toughness is expected to have an effect of 0.07 on the dependent 
variable, about 0.1 standard deviations. Since the dependent variable is log-transformed, 
this is equivalent to an increase in support of 7 percent (not percentage points). In the 
median municipality, where support for the Sweden Democrats is 4.01 percent, a one 
standard deviation increase in the mainstream parties’ anti-immigration toughness is thus 
predicted to increase support for the Sweden Democrats with 0.28 percentage points. 
While this effect hardly seems to be a game-changer, it is important to bear in mind that 
we model the change in electoral support, not the level. And since past electoral support 
has a substantial positive effect on current support, it is possible that a tough mainstream 
position on immigration leads to successive and cumulative gains for the anti-immigrant 
party. 
 
Looking closer at the control variables, the education level of the municipal population 
has the strongest and most consistent effect. If the education level were to increase by one 
percent, support for SD would decrease by 0.38 percent, according to model 5. The share 
of foreign-born among the municipal population has a positive effect in models 3 and 4, 
but is rendered insignificant when regional dummy variables are included.4 A curvilinear 
effect of age is observed in model 3 and 4, but is substantially mitigated to the point of 
                                                 
4 The results are substantially identical if the variable is exchanged for the share with foreign background, 
or with foreign citizenship. 
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insignificance in models 5 and 6. In the latter models, the effect of age is significant and 
negative when the mean age in the municipality is 42 or higher, which is true for two-
thirds of the sample. Only one party variable has a significant effect: the Sweden 
democrats gained less in the municipalities where the Liberal Party was more successful 
in 2006. 
 
How can the effect of mainstream toughness be interpreted? Is it merely a reflection of 
Arzheimer and Carter’s (2006) suggestion, that it is the position of the largest 
conservative party that matters? To answer this question, the variable for mean toughness 
is split into toughness of the parties belonging to the red-green coalition, and the parties 
in the centre-right coalition. In table 3, three regression models using the split 
independent variable are presented, using the same sets of control variables as in table 2. 
In model 1, the only control is SD support in 2006, while model 2 also includes socio-
economic controls, and model 3 includes regional dummy variables. 
 
*** Table 3 about here *** 
 
Both the toughness of the left and the toughness of the right have positive coefficients in 
all models, but perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient for the toughness of the 
left is larger. It is also significant in models 2 and 3, while the toughness of the right 
coefficient is not. 
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However, to fully test Arzheimer and Carters (2006) hypothesis that it is the position of 
the largest conservative party that matters, the toughness variable is divided into 
individual parties, which are then inserted into the regression model one at a time 
together with the other control variables. It is impossible to test all of the individual 
parties in a single model, since the smaller parties are unrepresented in many 
municipalities. Figure 1 shows the unstandardized b-coefficients of the toughness 
variables for each party together with 90 percent confidence intervals. 
 
*** Figure 1 about here*** 
 
The results can be said to give some credence to Arzheimer and Carter (2006) as the only 
negative coefficient is found for the Conservatives. This effect is however not significant, 
even at the 90 percent level, and should thus be interpreted very carefully. Effects for the 
Social Democrats, the Green Party and the Liberal party are significant (Social 
Democrats and Liberal at the 95 percent level) and positive. The Liberals is the 
mainstream party that since the 2002 election probably is closes associated with a tough 
stance on immigration (Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004), but also the mainstream party 
with the clearest ownership of the immigration issue (Odmalm forthcoming), which 
might be the reason why it has a stronger legitimizing effect than other parties. It is also 
interesting that a tougher stance from the Social Democrats significantly affect the 
Sweden Democrats electoral success. We can only speculate why this effect occurs, but it 
is possible that Social Democratic voters with anti-immigrant attitude interpret a tougher 
stance on immigration from the Social Democrats as a signal that immigration is an 
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important issue, but are at the same time not satisfied with the Social Democratic position 
(although it is tougher) and therefore moves to the Sweden Democrats. As observed by 
van der Brug and van Spanje (2009) there is a large group of voters, who has left-wing 
attitudes on socio-economic issues but right-wing attitudes on cultural issues, which are 
not represented in Western European politics. It is plausible that this kind of voters has 
voted for the Social Democrats in Sweden and at the same time are the ones most easily 
affected by shifts in issue strategies. It does not seam unreasonable as the Social 
Democrats to a fairly large extent lost voters directly to the Sweden Democrats in the 
2006 election (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2008). 
 
To test the robustness of the results, we tested the effect of mainstream anti-immigration 
toughness in a number of alternative model specifications. Without control for electoral 
support for the Sweden Democrats in 2006, the results point in the same direction, but the 
coefficients for toughness increase in size and significance. Furthermore, Arzheimer and 
Carter  (2009) warn that spatial correlations may drive the results in studies on the sub-
national level. In addition to the regional fixed effects, we therefore also included a 
variable indicating the mean (logged) support for the Sweden Democrats in 2006 in all 
neighboring municipalities. The effect of this variable was very weak and failed to 
achieve statistical significance. We also included other variables related to the “political 
opportunity structure”, such as the effective number of parties and mean ideology of the 
mainstream parties (as measured in the survey of local politicians). None of the variables 
had any significant effects, and did not affect the coefficient of the main independent 
variable. 
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A possible objection to our model is that success for anti-immigrant parties is the result 
of short-term changes in the independent variables, and not the result of absolute levels 
on the independent variables. We therefore estimated models in which we included 
independent variables measuring change in unemployment, education level, population 
and the number of inhabitants with foreign background between 2006 and 2009.5 The 
coefficient for mean toughness decreased slightly in this model, but remains clearly 
significant.  
 
To rule out that results are biased by outliers in the data, we also reran models with 
jackknife and bootstrap procedures, which did not affect the results. 
 
Summing up the results, empirical evidence seems to support the notion that a tough 
stance on immigration from mainstream parties legitimizes the otherwise taboo policies 
of the anti-immigrant parties, rather than crowd them out. Our results hence support the 
facilitating hypothesis. However, it is not enough that one party takes a tough stance – the 
variable indicating the position of the toughest party is insignificant. We only find 
support when operationalizing mainstream party toughness as the weighted mean of the 
mainstream parties’ position. Specifically, toughness of the parties on the left seem to be 
more legitimizing than the toughness of the parties on the right. 
 
                                                 
5 Changes were calculated as the difference between the level 2009 and 2006, as data for 2010 are yet 
unable.  
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Conclusions 
In this paper, we have argued that short-term variations in electoral support for anti-
immigrant parties are affected by the mainstream parties’ policy positions on 
immigration. Research has suggested that a tough position can both impede and facilitate 
anti-immigrant parties. We have tested these two competing hypotheses, using a unique 
sub-national dataset on the 290 Swedish local governments in the 2010 elections. The 
results show that if mainstream parties take a tough position on immigration it facilitates 
anti-immigrant party success. Even when controlling for a large number of socio-
economic, historical and regional alternative explanations, electoral support for the 
Sweden Democrats (the largest anti-immigrant party in Sweden) are stronger in 
municipalities where representatives of mainstream parties has tougher positions on 
immigration. Thus, our main conclusion is that tougher policy positions of mainstream 
parties on the immigration issue facilitate electoral anti-immigrant party success.  
 
Looking closer at the facilitating hypothesis, the analysis in this paper contributes with 
three additional and important observations. First, contrary to what has been argued in 
previous research (Arzheimer and Carter 2006) it is not enough if one mainstream party 
takes a tough stance on immigration. In order to have a statistically significant effect on 
the electoral success of the Sweden Democrats, the political immigration discourse must 
become tougher. This indicates that voters need to see that several of the mainstream 
parties have tough positions on immigration, in order to interpret it as a positive signal for 
the Sweden Democrats policy position. This is probably only natural, as the barrier of 
non-respectability for anti-immigrant parties are hard to overcome. 
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Second, and again opposing the most common position in the literature (Bale 2003, 2008; 
Arzheimer and Carter 2006), the paper suggests that it is not necessarily the political right 
that holds the key to the making or breaking of the success of anti-immigrant parties, but 
the political left. Using the same very demanding controls as in the main analysis, we 
report a statistically significant and positive correlation between the toughness of the left 
(including the Left party, the Social Democrats and the Greens) and the success of the 
Sweden Democrats. This is especially interesting as we fail to establish the same 
relationship between the political right (including the Liberals, the Center Party, The 
Conservatives and the Christian Democrats) and the success of Sweden Democrats. 
 
Third, looking at the effects of single parties, our findings again go against important 
stances in the literature. Previous research has almost exclusively (Arzheimer and Carter 
2006; van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2005; but for an exception see Arzheimer 2009) 
focused on the relationship between the largest (or most extreme) mainstream right party 
and the anti-immigrant party. We report statistically significant and positive relations 
between the positions of the Greens, the Social Democrats, and the Liberals on the one 
hand, and the electoral success of the Sweden Democrats on the other hand (none of the 
other parties show statistically significant coefficients). Even more interesting, the 
strongest and most significant relationship is between the policy position of the Social 
Democrats and electoral success of the Sweden Democrats. Again, this underlines that it 
can not be taken for granted that the political right is at the center of the story. The Social 
Democrats indeed seem to have a large potential to facilitate the Sweden Democrats. 
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Finally, after the conclusions presented in this paper, one intriguing question for future 
research is why the mainstream parties take tough positions on the immigration issue 
when it is obviously bad for them. Empirical studies have shown that the anti-
immigration policies of anti-immigrant parties are “contagious”, meaning that it has an 
effect on policies of mainstream parties (van Spanje 2010). It can of course mirror real-
world problems, but we would suggest that it can also be the result of a strategically 
motivated vicious circle. When the mainstream parties observe stronger support for an 
anti-immigrant party, a natural reaction from a Downsian perspective is to move in the 
direction of a tougher immigration policy position, as this is a both underrepresented and 
popular position (Dahlström and Esaiasson forthcoming). This is probably what 
happened in Denmark in the late 1990s (Downs 2002; Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 
2008) and might also be what is happening in Sweden after the 2010 election. 
Unfortunately, we do not have the data to test this hypothesis properly, but we will end 
by showing a figure that gives a crude indication that there might be something to it.  
 
***Figure 2 about here*** 
 
Figure 2 shows a fairly strong positive bivariate relationship between the electoral 
success of the Sweden Democrats in the 2006 election and the attitudes of the mainstream 
parties in 2008 (Pearson’s R = 0.28, p=0.000). A possible interpretation is that the 
mainstream parties observed the electoral gains for the Sweden Democrats 2006 and 
therefore adopted tougher positions on the immigration issue, which in turn facilitated the 
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success for the Sweden democrats in 2010. If this is actually the case is however for 
future research to answer. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Sd Min Max 
Ln(SD vote share 2010) 1.34 0.68 -0.87 2.96 
Ln(SD vote share 2006) 0.61 0.89 -3.05 3.10 
Mean toughness 0.33 0.07 0.15 0.68 
Max toughness     
Proportion men 2009 50.26 0.75 48.1 52.4 
Median income 2009 (1000 SEK) 222.29 20.03 185.72 308.29 
Ln(Proportion highly educated 2009) 3.05 0.31 2.55 4.05 
Ln(Population 2009) 9.83 0.94 7.82 13.63 
Ln(Area 2009) 6.49 1.25 2.16 9.87 
Ln(Foreign-born/1000 cap 2009) 2.45 0.48 1.44 3.96 
Open unemployment 2008 2.79 0.72 1.02 4.81 
New Democracy vote share 1994 1.15 0.50 0.08 2.89 
Nationalist vote share 1936 0.80 1.36 0.00 11.75 
Mean age in the population 2009 42.83 2.47 37.00 48.50 
Vote shares for mainstream parties     
Left 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.58 
Green 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.11 
Centre 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.47 
Liberals 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.23 
Christian democrats 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.44 
Conservatives 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.67 
Local parties 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.43 
Comment: N=287.
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Table 2 
The effects of mean and max toughness on anti-immigrant party success 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Ln(SD vote share 2006) 0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.66*** 
(0.02) 
0.60*** 
(0.03) 
0.62*** 
(0.03) 
0.44*** 
(0.04) 
0.45*** 
(0.04) 
Mean toughness 0.89*** 
(0.29) 
 
 
1.18*** 
(0.32) 
 
 
1.00*** 
(0.30) 
 
 
Max toughness  
 
0.16 
(0.14) 
 
 
0.07 
(0.13) 
 
 
0.01 
(0.12) 
Proportion men 2009  
 
 
 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Median income 2009 (1000 SEK)  
 
 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Ln(Proportion highly educated 
2009) 
 
 
 
 
-0.38** 
(0.15) 
-0.38** 
(0.16) 
-0.38** 
(0.16) 
-0.38** 
(0.16) 
Ln(Population 2009)  
 
 
 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Ln(Area 2009)  
 
 
 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Ln(Foreign-born/1000 cap 2009)  
 
 
 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.15** 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
Open unemployment 2008  
 
 
 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
New Democracy vote share 1994  
 
 
 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
Nationalist vote share 1936  
 
 
 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Mean age in the population 2009  
 
 
 
0.77*** 
(0.24) 
0.82*** 
(0.24) 
0.32 
(0.23) 
0.33 
(0.24) 
Mean age in the population 2009 
squared 
 
 
 
 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Vote shares 2006 (reference: 
Social democrats) 
      
Left  
 
 
 
0.46 
(0.48) 
0.62 
(0.49) 
0.06 
(0.46) 
0.21 
(0.47) 
Green  
 
 
 
1.41 
(1.32) 
0.77 
(1.35) 
0.63 
(1.31) 
0.20 
(1.33) 
Centre  
 
 
 
0.50 
(0.33) 
0.55* 
(0.34) 
0.07 
(0.34) 
0.16 
(0.34) 
Liberals  
 
 
 
-0.92 
(0.62) 
-0.66 
(0.63) 
-1.35** 
(0.62) 
-1.11* 
(0.63) 
Christian democrats  
 
 
 
0.23 
(0.46) 
0.42 
(0.47) 
-0.71 
(0.49) 
-0.62 
(0.50) 
Conservatives  
 
 
 
0.45 
(0.36) 
0.74** 
(0.36) 
-0.39 
(0.38) 
-0.12 
(0.38) 
Local parties   1.18*** 
(0.34) 
0.89*** 
(0.34) 
0.26 
(0.34) 
0.04 
(0.34) 
Constant 0.65*** 
(0.09) 
0.85*** 
(0.08) 
-16.57*** 
(5.84) 
-16.68*** 
(5.98) 
-7.05 
(5.73) 
-6.56 
(5.86) 
Regional dummy variables No No No No Yes Yes 
N 289 289 287 287 287 287 
R2adj 0.771 0.765 0.812 0.802 0.852 0.845 
Comment: OLS regression, unstandardized b-coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
30
 
Table 3 
Effect of toughness among the left and right mainstream parties.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Left toughness 0.55*** 
(0.21) 
0.54** 
(0.22) 
0.45** 
(0.21) 
Right toughness 0.35* 
(0.21) 
0.31 
(0.21) 
0.21 
(0.20) 
Control variables No Yes Yes 
Regional dummy variables No No Yes 
Comment: OLS regression, unstandardized b-coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. 
Effect of toughness of individual parties. OLS-regression, unstandardized b-coefficients, 90 percent 
confidence intervals. 
 
Comment: N: Left 222, Soc. Dem. 286, Green 183, Centre 269, Liberal 251, Chr. Dem. 239, Cons. 275 
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Figure 2. 
Relationship between electoral success for the Sweden Democrats in 2006 and mean toughness of the 
mainstream parties in 2008. 
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